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Abstract
A remarkable theorem by Clifton, Bub and Halverson (2003) (CBH)
characterizes quantum theory in terms of information–theoretic prin-
ciples. According to Bub (2004, 2005) the philosophical significance of
the theorem is that quantum theory should be regarded as a “princi-
ple” theory about (quantum) information rather than a “constructive”
theory about the dynamics of quantum systems. Here we propose an
alternative view according to which the philosophical significance of
the CBH theorem lies in the predictions of quantum theory which re-
main hitherto unobserved, and in the empirical inequivalence between
the constructive and the principle explanations thereof. We further
challenge the principle information–theoretic view with a thought ex-
periment that stems from this empirical inequivalence.
Keywords: Quantum information; Collapse theories; Crucial experiments;
Principle vs. Constructive theories.
∗Philosophy Department, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716 USA; Email:
hagar@udel.edu
†Philosophy Department, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel 31905; Email:
meir@research.haifa.ac.il
1
1 Introduction
Quantum information theory has by now become to a large extent a new
orthodoxy in the foundations of quantum mechanics. It is sometimes further
claimed that the information–theoretic approach brings out the so–called
“futility” of the long-standing debates over the interpretations of quantum
mechanics.1 A major conceptual tool enhancing the information–theoretic
approach is the remarkable theorem by Clifton, Bub and Halverson (2003,
CBH henceforth) according to which quantum theory can be characterized by
three information–theoretic principles: no signaling, no broadcasting and no
(unconditionally secure) bit commitment (NO BIT henceforth). The purpose
of this paper is to examine the information–theoretic approach to quantum
mechanics focusing on Bub’s (2004, 2005) recent analysis of it and some of
its implications.
On the basis of the above three principles of the CBH theorem, Bub
(2004, p. 242; see also 2005) argues for the following three theses:
1. A quantum theory is best understood as a theory about
the possibilities and impossibilities of information transfer
as opposed to a theory about the mechanics of nonclassical
waves or particles.2
2. Given the three information–theoretic constraints, any me-
chanical theory of quantum phenomena that includes an ac-
count of the measuring instruments that reveal these phe-
nomena must be empirically equivalent to a quantum theory.
3. Assuming the information–theoretic constraints are in fact
satisfied in our world, any mechanical theory of quantum
phenomena that includes an account of measurement in-
teractions can be acceptable, and the appropriate aim of
physics at the fundamental level then becomes the represen-
tation and manipulation of information.
In his recent paper in this journal, Bub (2005) depicts the philosophical
significance of the CBH theorem as analogous to Einstein’s shift from the con-
structive view of theories—attributed to Lorentz and FitzGerald—towards
1For such a claim see Fuchs (2002); For a response—Hagar (2003)
2By information Bub means information in the physical sense as measured, e. g., in
quantum mechanics by the von Neumann entropy.
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the principle view of theories in the context of the special theory of relativ-
ity (STR henceforth).3 His idea is that the distinction between constructive
theories and theories of principle is suitable to characterize the difference
between the information–theoretic approach and all other interpretations of
quantum theory. As the above theses show, Bub believes that if, indeed,
the three information–theoretic principles of the CBH theorem hold in our
world, then no constructive theory for quantum phenomena is possible that
yields different predictions than those of quantum theory.
Agreeing as we do with Bub’s second thesis (that any constructive the-
ory for quantum phenomena which satisfies the three information–theoretic
principles of the CBH theorem is empirically indistinguishable from quantum
theory) here we wish to present a somewhat different view on the philosoph-
ical significance of the CBH theorem.4 As Bub (2004) himself notes (and in
accord with his second thesis) a certain constructive theory for quantum phe-
nomena, namely the collapse theory by Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (GRW)
does give different predictions from those of quantum theory, while violating
the NO BIT constraint (above). However, this violation is compatible with
everything we know empirically about the physical world. Roughly, the NO
BIT constraint implies the unrestricted validity of the superposition prin-
ciple, and in particular, it entails that macroscopic massive systems might
be in nonlocal entangled EPR–type states even with respect to their spatial
degrees of freedom. But the existence of such macrostates has never been
experimentally confirmed, so we do not really know empirically whether or
not they are physically possible. In this paper we focus only on collapse
theories as constructive alternatives to Bub’s principle approach.5 We shall
3For more on the constructive approach to STR see Ja´nossy (1971) and Brown (2003).
4We set aside the more general issue of the aim of physics as stated by Bub’s third
thesis. In this context it is interesting that Maxwell, although accepting the distinction
between the physics of principles and the construction of models and even admitting
that in principle indefinitely many dynamical models can explain certain phenomena,
nevertheless devoted his career almost solely to the construction of such models (Harman
2001). Einstein himself, after promoting in 1905 the distinction he borrowed from Maxwell
and Poincare´ between principles and constructions, shifted back to the constructive view
and later on abandoned what he called “the new fashion” which he himself helped creating
(Balashov and Janssen 2003).
5We do not address here the subtler issue of whether or not Bohmian mechanics might
be distinguished empirically from other no collapse theories such as modal and many worlds
theories and Bub’s principle approach. We agree with Bub (2005) that Bohmian mechanics
is empirically equivalent to no collapse quantum mechanics (but compare Valentini (2002)).
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argue for the following alternative theses.
I. Bub’s principle information–theoretic approach and alterna-
tive constructive collapse theories, such as the GRW theory
are empirically distinguishable. This is obvious but in the
present context deserves attention.6
II. Bub’s information–theoretic construal of quantum theory
on the basis of the CBH theorem—whatever merit it may
carry—gives no reason for abandoning constructive dynam-
ical theories, in particular theories which differ empirically
from quantum mechanics under Bub’s approach. The lesson
one should take from the CBH theorem lies not in the quan-
tum phenomena captured by its three information–theoretic
principles, but rather in the predictions of quantum mechan-
ics, given the general validity of the CBH constraints, which
up to now remain unobserved.
III. The information–theoretic approach to quantum mechanics
is incomplete and must be supplemented by further princi-
ples over and above those suggested by the CBH theorem.
In particular, the notion of quantum information cannot be
taken as a primitive but rather requires a quantum mechan-
ical analysis of measurement of the kind suggested by con-
structive theories.
The paper is structured as follows. We briefly review in Section 2 the
CBH theorem and the purported philosophical significance Bub attaches to
it. In Section 3 we explain how the GRW collapse theory bears on the
CBH information–theoretic principles, focusing in particular on the NO BIT
principle that Bub sees as constraining any constructive model for quantum
phenomena (Section 3.1). In Section 3.2 we argue for thesis II above, namely
that the issue at stake is different explanations of as yet unobserved quantum
predictions. In Section 4, we focus on the empirical inequivalence between
On the other hand, we note that questions of theory choice depend on quite complex factors
and not only on empirical content.
6There are some definite suggestions of crucial tests between the GRW theory and
standard quantum mechanics which bear on the implications of the different rates of
GRW collapses and decoherence (see Adler 2005, Adler et al. 2005, Bassi et al. 2005,
Hemmo and Shenker 2005).
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the constructive GRW theory and information–theoretic approaches: we first
challenge the latter with a thought experiment that establishes our thesis III
above (Section 4.1); and we consider various possible replies to our argu-
ment in Section 4.2. Finally, in Section 5 we consider another often stated
argument against collapse theories and explain why this argument is unac-
ceptable.
2 The CBH Theorem and Its Philosophical
Significance
The question raised by CBH is whether we can deduce the kinematic aspects
of the quantum–theoretic description of physical systems from the assump-
tion that we live in a world in which there are certain constraints on the ac-
quisition, representation, and communication of information. CBH answered
this question positively, supplying three information–theoretic principles (so-
called three no-go’s) that are supposed to filter out the algebraic structure of
operators and states that characterize quantum theory from the more basic
structure of C∗-algebra.
The first principle, called no signaling, prohibits superluminal transfer of
information between spacelike separated systems by carrying out measure-
ments on one of them. In other words, no signaling says that measurements
(and in fact any physical manipulation) confined to a remote system cannot
possibly change the statistics of the outcomes of measurements that might
be carried out on the local system. If Alice and Bob are two physically
distinct systems,7 then when both perform local measurements, Alice’s mea-
surements can have no influence on the statistics of the outcomes of Bob’s
measurements, and conversely. This result follows from the no signaling the-
orem in quantum mechanics according to which local measurements on a
system α have no effect whatsoever on the reduced state of a remote system
7Consider a composite quantum system A+B, consisting of two subsystems, A and
B. For simplicity, assume the systems are identical, so their C∗–algebras A and B are
isomorphic. The observables of the component systems A and B are represented by the
self-adjoint elements of A and B, respectively. Let A∨B denote the C∗–algebra generated
by A and B. To capture the idea that A and B are physically distinct systems, we assume
(as a necessary condition) that any state of A is compatible with any state of B, i.e.,
for any state ρA of A and ρB of B, there is a state ρ of A ∨B such that ρ|A = ρA and
ρ|B = ρB .
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β no matter what the quantum state of α+ β is. (see Ghirardi et al. 1980).
The second principle, called no broadcasting, prohibits perfectly broad-
casting the information contained in an unknown physical state.8 No broad-
casting ensures that the individual algebras A and B of the two distinct
physical systems are noncommutative. As CBH show, broadcasting and
cloning are always possible for classical systems, i.e., in commutative C∗–
algebra there is a universal broadcasting map that clones any pair of input
pure states and broadcasts any pair of input mixed states. Conversely, they
show that if any two states can be (perfectly) broadcast, then any two pure
states can be cloned; and if two pure states of a C∗-algebra can be cloned,
then they must be orthogonal. So, if any two states can be broadcast, then
all pure states are orthogonal, from which it follows that the algebra is com-
mutative. In elementary quantum mechanics, on the other hand, neither
cloning nor broadcasting is possible in general.
These two principles capture two well known features of quantum the-
ory: for a composite system A+B, the no signaling constraint entails that
the C∗–algebras A and B, whose self-adjoint elements represent the observ-
ables of A and B, commute with each other (this feature is sometimes called
‘micro-causality’); and the no broadcasting constraint entails that each of
the algebras A and B are noncommutative. The quantum mechanical phe-
nomenon of interference is the physical manifestation of the noncommuta-
tivity of quantum observables or, equivalently, the superposition of quantum
states.
The third NO BIT principle prohibits communicating information in a
way that implements a given ‘bit commitment’ with unconditional security.9
In quantum mechanics Alice may send Bob, as a warrant of her bit commit-
ment, one of two mixtures associated with the same density operator (where
the mixtures correspond to alternative commitments). However, Alice may
prepare in advance a suitable entangled state, where the reduced density
8In fact, for pure states, broadcasting reduces to cloning. In cloning, a ready state σ of
a system B and the state to be cloned ρ of system A are transformed into two copies of ρ.
In broadcasting, a ready state σ of B and the state to be broadcast ρ of A are transformed
to a new state ω of A+B, where the marginal states of ω with respect to both A and B
are ρ.
9Bit commitment is a cryptographic protocol in which, say, Alice sends an encoded bit
to Bob as a record of her commitment to either 0 or 1, which allows Bob to ascertain
Alice’s bit commitment later (only with further information supplied by Alice) so as to
make sure that her initial commitment hasn’t changed. In classical information theory
unconditionally secure bit commitment is always possible in principle.
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operator for Bob is the same as that of the mixture she sent him. In this
case Alice would be able to steer Bob’s system nonlocally into either one
of the two mixtures (where Bob cannot be aware of this). So if there are
no restrictions on the entangled states that Alice may prepare, Alice can
always cheat Bob by pretending to have a secure bit commitment. The NO
BIT constraint prohibits unconditionally secure bit commitment by precisely
stipulating that there are no restrictions on the preparation and stability of
entangled nonlocal states. Note that the structure that the first two prin-
ciples filter out from the general C∗–algebra still includes noncommutative
theories which are compatible with unconditionally secure bit commitment.
In such theories, it might be, for example, that although nonlocal entangled
states (i. e., states which permit remote steering) are physically possible, they
turn out to be as a matter of fact highly unstable (over time) and therefore
not feasible.10 So one has to stipulate the feasibility of such states, and this
is what the NO BIT constraint does.
Taking stock, the content of the CBH theorem, according to Bub (2005),
is this:
. . . [Q]uantum theories—theories where (i) the observables of the
theory are represented by the self-adjoint operators in a noncom-
mutative C∗–algebra (but the algebras of observables of distinct
systems commute), (ii) the states of the theory are represented by
C∗–algebraic states (positive normalized linear functionals on the
C∗–algebra), and spacelike separated systems can be prepared in
entangled states that allow remote steering, and (iii) dynamical
changes are represented by completely positive linear maps—are
characterized by the three information–theoretic ‘no-go’s’: no su-
perluminal communication of information via measurement, no
(perfect) broadcasting, and no (unconditionally secure) bit com-
mitment.
In order to flesh out the philosophical significance of the CBH theorem,
Bub (2005) makes use of the famous distinction between theories of principles
and constructive theories. According to this distinction (which is attributed
usually to Einstein although it already appears in the writings of Maxwell
and Poincare´),
10As noted by Bub, such a possibility in which an entangled state of a composite system
quickly decays to a mixture as soon as the component systems spatially separate was raised
by Schro¨dinger in 1936.
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[constructive theories] attempt to build up a picture of the more
complex phenomena out of the materials of the relatively simple
formal scheme from which they start out. Thus the kinetic theory
of gases seeks to reduce mechanical, thermal and diffusional pro-
cesses to the movement of molecules—i.e., to build them up of the
hypothesis of molecular motion. [Principle theories, on the other
hand,] . . .employ the analytic, not the synthetic method. The
elements which form their basis and starting point are not hy-
pothetically construed but empirically discovered ones, general
characteristics of natural processes, principles that give rise to
mathematically formulated criteria which the separate processes
or the theoretical representations of them have to satisfy. Thus
the science of thermodynamics seeks by analytical means to de-
duce necessary conditions which separate events have to satisfy,
from the universally experienced fact that perpetual motion is
impossible (Einstein 1919).
In his analysis of quantum mechanics as a principle theory, Bub appeals
to two different historical analogies where scientific progress has been clearly
achieved. In his (2004) he considers the transition from the constructive
ether-theory of Lorentz–FitzGerald to the abstract geometric formalism of
Minkowski’s spacetime and argues that the transition was only made possi-
ble by Einstein’s principle approach to special relativity. And in (2005) Bub
focuses on the transition (in the ‘opposite’ direction) from thermodynamics
(as a sort of a principle theory) to the constructive theory of statistical me-
chanics (in the special case of the kinetic-molecular theory). In both cases
we agree with Bub’s historical analysis, but we are doubtful as to the con-
clusions he draws about quantum mechanics. Bub argues that the CBH
theorem plays the same role in a principle approach to quantum mechanics
as the one played by Einstein’s principle approach to relativity theory. Focus-
ing on Bohmian mechanics as a constructive mechanical model of quantum
mechanics, Bub’s argument consists of essentially three elements: First, in
special relativity the structure of spacetime is understood in terms of a new
primitive—i. e., a field—which is not reducible to mechanical motion (e. g.,
of particles relative to the ether as in the Lorentz theory). Similarly, in quan-
tum mechanics, the algebraic structure of observables is understood in terms
of a new primitive, i. e., quantum information not reducible to the behav-
ior of mechanical systems (e. g., particle trajectories in configuration space).
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Second, in both cases the principle approaches are simpler and more fruitful.
In the case of quantum theory the CBH theorem is taken to explain away
(using the above constrains on information flow) some problematic notions
in Bohmian mechanics such as sourceless fields that guide the trajectories of
particles in configuration space (that sometimes even result in e. g., surreal
trajectories and contextual probabilities). At the same time the information-
theoretic approach brings out new implications of quantum mechanics such
as the use of entanglement as a new physical resource for quantum compu-
tation. Third, and most crucially in the present context, the constructive
mechanical alternatives to quantum theory are empirically indistinguishable
from the principle theories.
The point of Bub’s second analogy (i. e., the transition from thermody-
namics to the kinetic-molecular theory) is precisely to bring out the immense
importance of empirical distinguishability in theory choice. Here the argu-
ment is that the kinetic-molecular theory would not be regarded seriously as
an alternative constructive model for thermodynamics if (contrary to fact) it
had no new empirical predictions that differ from those of thermodynamics,
and if those predictions were not experimentally confirmed (e. g., Einstein’s
prediction of fluctuations in Brownian motion). By contrast, in the case of
Bohmian mechanics it is provable that (i) once the distribution of the par-
ticles’ positions is given by the square of the amplitude of the wavefunction
at each point (i. e., by the Born probabilities) this distribution is preserved
at all later times by the dynamical equations of motion (see Du¨rr, Goldstein
and Zanghi 1992); and (ii) given the Born distribution, Bohm’s theory is em-
pirically equivalent to quantum mechanics. This means, in the information–
theoretic approach, that Bohm’s theory must be equivalent to quantum the-
ory if the CBH constrains on the information flow were satisfied even once
in the past (since, roughly, in a no collapse theory these constrains hold if
and only if the Born probability distribution holds). Consequently, Bohm’s
theory, quite unlike the case of Brownian motion, can yield no predictions of
‘fluctuations’ that deviate from the predictions of quantum mechanics. And
therefore, given Bub’s arguments above, the rational epistemological stance,
is to reject it, and prefer the principle information–theoretic approach as
suggested by the CBH theorem.
In what follows we question Bub’s reading of the present state of affairs in
quantum mechanics. Although we largely agree with Bub’s analysis (sketched
above) of the features of alternative hidden variables theories, we think that
the analysis doesn’t capture all the relevant aspects related to theory choice
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in the case of the present state of quantum mechanics. In particular, there
are two crucial points that seem to us not appropriately addressed in Bub’s
analysis. First, there are other constructive quantum mechanical theories
(in particular the GRW collapse theory) which generally violate the NO BIT
constraint (at least as a stable constraint; see below). The GRW theory dif-
fers in its empirical predictions from quantum theory, while it is perfectly
compatible with our experience so far. By Bub’s own standards (see Bub
2005, Sec. 4), therefore, the GRW theory is acceptable as an alternative con-
structive theory. But adhering to Bub’s principle approach would result in
loosing sight of theories like the GRW theory on what seems like an a–priori
rather than an empirical basis. Second, information–theoretic approaches
(i. e., both Bub’s principle approach and the Bayesian approach) are incom-
plete, and as we said (in our thesis (iii) above) need be supplemented by
further principles that are quite hard to justify (see Section 4). On the basis
of these two points we now proceed to argue for our thesis (ii), namely that
the issue at stake lies not in the information–theoretic description of the ob-
served quantum phenomena, but rather in the explanation of the predictions
of quantum theory which up to now remain unobserved.
3 Explaining the Unobserved
Standard no collapse quantum theory predicts the unrestrictive existence of
superpositions in spatially separated entangled states. This is tantamount
to saying, using the CBH theorem, that ex hypothesis the NO BIT princi-
ple holds in our world. But then, given this hypothesis, one question that
arises naturally is: why do superpositions remain unobserved in macroscopic
massive physical systems?
This question is in fact a variant on the so-called measurement problem
in the quantum theory of measurement. In this context the problem arises
as a straightforward consequence of applying the Schro¨dinger linear and de-
terministic dynamics to the measurement interaction. As is well known the
Schro¨dinger dynamics results for a generic measurement in a superposition
of the form
|Ψ〉 =
∑
i
µi|ψi〉 ⊗ |ϕi〉, (1)
where the kets |ψi〉 represent some suitably defined pointer states of the mea-
suring apparatus (typically, the |ψi〉 are eigenstates of the pointer position),
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and the |ϕi〉 are some states of the system. The problem is that in states of
the form (1) the measurement has no definite outcome (except in the special
case where all but one of the µi are zero), since the final (reduced) state
of the apparatus cannot in general be described in terms of an ensemble of
systems in a classical mixture (in which the |µi|2 represent the probabilities
for each |ψi〉 to actually occur).
The information–theoretic approach addresses this problem by appealing
to models of decoherence in which the interaction of relatively massive sys-
tems with their environment brings about a so-called effective collapse onto
the eigenstates of some preferred observables (typically, position).11 Accord-
ing to this approach (called by Bub 1997 some years ago the ‘new ortho-
doxy’) macroscopic entangled states in position exist, but for all practical
purpose they are unobserved because we have no control over the states of
the environment, so that the reduced state of a decohering system is practi-
cally indistinguishable from a classical mixture. That this is no solution to
the measurement problem was argued in the past by many,12 including Bub
himself in the context of (constructive) hidden variables theories.13 However,
Bub seems to think that the objection does not apply to his own principle
information–theoretic approach. We disagree and will argue for this in Sec-
tion 4. But before doing so, we wish to consider here the constructive collapse
theory by GRW that gives a clear and distinct solution to the measurement
problem and explains the unobservability of macroscopic spatial superposi-
tions in the most straightforward way.
3.1 The Collapse Theory of GRW
The GRW theory (formulated for non–relativistic quantum mechanics) ex-
plains the unobservability of some macroscopic superpositions of position
states by modifying the Schro¨dinger linear dynamics in such a way that given
the new dynamics such superpositions are overwhelmingly likely to collapse
11For standard models of decoherence, see Joos et al. (2003) and references therein.
12E.g., Bell (1990), and recently Adler (2003).
13As Bub puts it in his (2000, 90–91): the fact that the ‘effective’ quantum state—an
improper mixture described by the reduced density operator (obtained by tracing out the
degrees of freedom of the environment)—is diagonal with respect to properties associated
with some pointer basis “not only fails to account for the occurrence of just one of these
[properties] but is actually inconsistent with such occurrence”, since taking into account
the environment gives us back the pure state from which the mixture was derived, and
this state is inconsistent with the occurrence of events associated with definite properties.
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at every moment of time, and in this sense they are highly unstable. The
Schro¨dinger equation is changed by adding to it a non-linear and stochastic
term that induces the so-called jump or collapse of the wavefunction. The
jump is supposed to occur on occasion in position space and its postulated
frequency is proportional roughly, to the mass density of the system (or in
Bell’s (1987) model on the number of particles described by the wavefunc-
tion). For our purposes it is enough to sketch Bell’s (1987) version of the
elementary and non–relativistic theory of GRW. This goes roughly as follows.
Consider the quantum mechanical wavefunction of a composite system
consisting of N particles:
ψ(t, r1, r2, ..., rN). (2)
The time evolution of the wavefunction usually (at almost all times) satisfies
the deterministic Schro¨dinger equation. But sometimes at random the wave-
function collapses or jumps) onto a wavefunction ψ` localized in position of
the (normalized) form
ψ` =
j(x− rn) ψ(t, r1, r2, ..., rN)
Rn(x)
, (3)
where rn in the jump factor j(x − rn) (which is normalized) is randomly
chosen from the arguments r1, ..., rn of the wavefunction immediately before
the jump, and Rn(x) is a suitable renormalization term. For j, GRW suggest
the Gaussian:
j(x) = K exp(−x2/2∆2), (4)
where the width ∆ of the Gaussian is supposed to be a new constant of
nature: ∆ ≈ 10−5cm.
Probabilities enter the theory twice. First, the probability that the col-
lapsed wavefunction ψ` after a jump is centered around the point x is given
by
d3x |Rn(x)|2 . (5)
This probability distribution, as can be seen, is proportional to the standard
quantum mechanical probability given by the Born rule for a position mea-
surement on a system with the wavefunction ψ(t, r) just prior to the jump.
Second, the probability in a unit time interval for a GRW jump is
N
τ
, (6)
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where N is the number of arguments in the wavefunction (i. e., in Bell’s
model it may be interpreted as the number of particles), and τ is, again, a
new constant of nature (τ ≈ 1015 sec ≈ 108 year). Note that the expression
(6) does not depend on the quantum wave function, but only on N . This is
essentially the whole theory.
It is easily seen that for microscopic systems GRW collapses have
extremely low probability to occur, so that the quantum mechanical
Schro¨dinger equation turns out to be literally true at almost all times in just
the way that no collapse quantum mechanics predicts (and experiment con-
firms). However, for massive macroscopic systems (e. g., for systems with 1023
particles) the GRW collapses are highly probable at all times. In measure-
ment situations the GRW theory implies that superpositions of macroscopi-
cally distinguished pointer states of the form (1) collapse with extremely high
probability onto the localized states |ψi〉 on time scales that are much faster
than measurement times. In particular, the probability that the wavefunc-
tion of the composite of system plus apparatus will stay in the superposition
(1) for more than a fraction of a second (e. g., by the time the measurement is
complete) vanishes exponentially. So the GRW jumps reduce wavefunctions
of the form (1) to one of the components |ψi〉 ⊗ |ϕi〉, in which the pointer
is in the localized state |ψi〉, where the probability for a collapse onto the
i-th term (see equation (5)) is given as usual by the squared amplitude |µi|2.
This means that in a sequence of quantum mechanical measurements the
GRW jumps result in definite outcomes with frequencies that are (approxi-
mately) equal to the Born-rule probabilities |µi|2. The measurement problem
is solved as long as measurements involve a macroscopic recording of the mea-
surement outcome in position (e. g., a moving pointer of a measuring device,
particles hitting on macroscopically separated regions of a computer screen,
etc.). Note that, and this is important for our discussion below, the GRW
jumps are designed to be extremely effective only for macroscopic superposi-
tions of position states (and to any other states that are coupled to positions),
but not to arbitrary superpositions.
There are well known physical weaknesses in the GRW theory. In the
non–relativistic case the problem seems to be how to avoid the accumulated
violations of conservation of energy induced by the jumps.14. But perhaps the
main problem is to write down a relativistic formulation of the GRW theory.
14See Ghirardi (2000) and references therein; Some progress is reported in Bassi et al .
(2005b)
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Although GRW give the same predictions as standard quantum mechanics
with respect to the nonlocal correlations in EPR–Bell–type experiments, the
problem is that it is not clear whether in a relativistic version of the GRW
dynamics the jumps could be made Lorentz–covariant.15 Also, it has been
argued against GRW that the theory appears to be strongly ad hoc as it
allows free adjustments of constants in order to be in agreement with ex-
periments. Here, however, we set these important issues aside, because we
are not concerned with the GRW theory per se, nor with its comparison
with other constructive theories. Rather, our focus is whether Bub’s prin-
ciple approach which seems to rule out the GRW theory on the basis of
information–theoretic constraints is acceptable.
3.2 Constructing the Principles
How does the GRW theory fare with the information–theoretic constraints
of the CBH theorem? The first thing to say is that the GRW theory does
not violate the first two constraints (i.e., no signaling and no broadcasting)
because of its stochastic dynamics (see, e. g., Gisin 1989). But, in accord
with Bub’s analysis, the GRW theory does violate the NO BIT principle in
the following sense. It predicts that superpositions of macroscopically dis-
tinguishable position states decay extremely quickly by the GRW dynamics
into the corresponding mixtures. Obviously, GRW do not introduce any sort
of superselection rules. The theory allows one to prepare any system in any
quantum state, and any pair of systems in any entangled and nonlocal state
(say, of the EPR–Bell–type) whatsoever. In particular, one may prepare, for
example, a superposition of highly entangled spin states even for a macro-
scopic number of particles that will be quite stable over a significant time
interval (e. g., as in the spin–echo experiments, where the spins get, as it
were, in and out of entangled states during an appreciable time interval; see
Hemmo and Shenker 2005). Such states are perfectly compatible with the
GRW dynamics. Moreover, one may even prepare any state of two massive
molecules in an entangled EPR–state over their positions. But, given the
GRW dynamics, states of this latter sort would be highly unstable due to
the extremely fast rates of the GRW jumps. More generally, it is an empiri-
cal prediction of the GRW theory that superpositions of entangled position
states of spatially separated systems are highly unstable if the systems are
15But see Ghirardi (2000) and Myrvold (2002).
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massive enough. Hence, observable effects of such superpositions are hard to
come by, and under normal circumstances, unobserved.
So the crucial point for our discussion is this. The violation of the NO
BIT constraint by the GRW theory is one indication that the theory is not
empirically equivalent to standard no collapse quantum mechanics. That is,
in the GRW theory an unconditionally secure bit commitment could always
be made possible via a set up that requires Alice to encode her bit com-
mitment in the position state of a massive enough system. However, when
one introduces the NO BIT constraint in the information–theoretic approach
one implicitly presupposes that as a matter of fact the entangled states one
works with are states of microsystems, say, over spin degrees of freedom. For
such states we have ample experimental confirmation that the NO BIT con-
straint is, indeed, satisfied. But for such states also the GRW theory satisfies
the NO BIT constraint with extremely high probability. It violates the NO
BIT constraint only with respect to superpositions of macroscopically distin-
guishable position states. But for such macrostates also standard no collapse
quantum theory predicts an effective violation of the NO BIT constraint due
to environmental decoherence (i. e., such states effectively collapse also in the
standard theory as all models of environmentally induced decoherence show;
see e. g., Zurek 1991, Joos et al. 2003).
So practically, no collapse quantum mechanics and the GRW theory agree
on the NO BIT constraint for all cases in which there are good empirical
reasons to believe it is true. And the two theories disagree about the NO BIT
constraint only with respect to those macro superpositions about which we do
not know whether or not they in fact exist in our world. But of course this is
no surprise since this disagreement is located precisely where the two theories
differ in their empirical predictions. So we are back to square one! The
CBH theorem provides an elegant formulation of the difference in principle
between theories of genuine collapse and theories of effective collapse (as in
situations of environmentally induced decoherence). But given what we know
empirically about the world, there seem to be no grounds for adopting the
NO BIT principle as an unrestrictive constraint on theory choice.16
16Note that the point made here is quite general: it would be applicable to any
information–theoretic characterization of the mathematical structure of quantum theory
(e. g., Spekkens 2004) and to any constructive alternative of it, provided the latter is
empirically well confirmed and not equivalent to standard quantum mechanics.
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4 Inconsistent Predictions?
We now proceed to argue for our thesis III, namely that information–theoretic
approaches to quantum mechanics are incomplete and need be supplemented
by further axioms that exceed information–theoretic principles such as those
suggested by the CBH theorem, or by subjectivist Bayesian approaches to
quantum mechanics (see e. g., Fuchs and Peres 2000, Fuchs 2002, Caves et al.
2002, Spekkens 2004, and references therein). For convenience, we shall frame
our discussion in the context of the Bayesian approach. After presenting our
argument in the form of a thought experiment, we shall make the link to
Bub’s principle approach.
The Bayesian approach to quantum theory is based on an epistemic atti-
tude according to which the quantum state does not represent a real physical
state of a system, but instead supplies an observer with statistical information
concerning all possible distributions of measurement results. The probabili-
ties computed by the standard Born rule are understood as probabilities of
finding the system on measurement in some specific state. Applying Von
Neumann’s projection postulate to the quantum state (or more generally ap-
plying Lu¨der’s rule), under this account, is just an adjustment of subjective
probabilities, conditionalizing on newly discovered results of measurement,
i. e., it is merely a change in the observer’s knowledge, or probability as-
signments. By contrast, the unitary and linear quantum mechanical dynam-
ics (i. e., the Schro¨dinger equation in the non-relativistic case) describes the
observer–independent and in this sense objective time evolution of the quan-
tum probabilities when no measurement takes place. Hence, in this approach
measurements can be treated operationally as ‘black boxes’ and require no
further theoretical analysis.
4.1 A thought experiment
We now turn to our thought experiment which a variant on Wigner’s friend.
Consider the following set–up in which an observer A measures the z–spin
of a spin-half particle P by means of a Stern–Gerlach apparatus (which, to
keep things simple, we omit from our description below). The quantum state
of P + A initially is
|Ψ0〉 = (α|+z〉+ β|−z〉)|ψ0〉A (7)
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where |α|2+ |β|2 = 1 (α, β 6= 0), the kets |±z〉 are the z−spin eigenstates and
|ψ0〉 is the initial ready state of A. After the measurement, in a no collapse
theory, the quantum mechanical state of P + A is the superposition:
|Ψ1〉 = α|+z〉|see up〉A + β|−z〉|see down〉A (8)
where |see up〉A and |see down〉A are, say, the brain states of A corresponding
to her perceptions and memories of the two possible outcomes of the mea-
surement. By contrast, in a collapse theory of the GRW kind, the state (8) is
highly unstable (assuming that the chain of interactions leading to A’s differ-
ent memory states involves macroscopically distinguishable position states),
so that by the time the measurement is complete this state collapses onto
one of its components.
Consider now an observable Oˆ of the composite system P+A of which the
state (8) is an eigenstate with some definite eigenvalue, say +1.17 Suppose
that the composite system P+A is completely isolated from the environment,
and that a measurement of Oˆ is about to be carried out on P+A immediately
after the state (8) obtains. According to no collapse quantum mechanics the
measurement of Oˆ, under these circumstances, is completely non-disturbing
in the sense that after the measurement the state of P +A remains precisely
as in (8). One may think of Oˆ as an observable that is maximally sensitive
to whether or not the interference terms between the different components
of (8) exist. In other words, the measurement of Oˆ on P +A if the state (8)
is the true state of P +A is a non-demolition measurement that, as it were,
passively verifies whether or not P + A is in fact in that state.
Note that Oˆ commutes neither with the z−spin nor with A’s perceptions
and memories of the outcomes of the z−spin measurement. This surely raises
interesting questions about the status of the uncertainty relations in this
set up and about the reliability of A’s memories of the outcome of her spin
measurement in the event thatAmeasures Oˆ just after her spin measurement.
However, no matter what happens during the measurement of Oˆ (to A’s
memory of the outcome of her spin measurement, or to the z−spin values
themselves) quantum mechanics implies that the correlations between the
z−spin of P and A’s memories must remain exactly the same as they were
17Observables like Oˆ are defined in the tensor product Hilbert space HP ⊗ HA unless
superselection rules are introduced. For our purposes think of Oˆ as an observable that
pertains to P ’s spin degree of freedom and the relevant degrees of freedom of A’s sense
organs, perceptions, memory, etc.
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before the Oˆ–measurement. Moreover, in a no collapse theory, the state of
P+A immediately after the Oˆ–measurement will be, with complete certainty,
just:
|Ψ2〉 = α|+z〉|see up〉|see Oˆ = +1〉+ β|−z〉|see down〉|see Oˆ = +1〉 (9)
where |see Oˆ = +1〉 is the state corresponding to perceiving the result of the
Oˆ–measurement.
By contrast, in a collapse theory of the GRW kind, the state of P + A
immediately after the Oˆ–measurement will be given by one of the eigenstates
of Oˆ, where the probability that it will be state (8), and therefore that
the outcome Oˆ = +1 will be obtained, is only |α|2. Note that even if that
outcome will obtain, the state (8) will extremely quickly collapse, again, onto
one of the components of state (8) with probabilities that are given by |α|2
and |β|2. So, in the GRW theory, the final value of the z−spin and the spin
memory of A might be different before and after the Oˆ–measurement.
Note further that we deliberately do not specify here who carries out
the Oˆ–measurement (i. e., in which degree of freedom the outcome Oˆ = +1
is recorded). It may be carried out by A or by some other observer B
external to A’s laboratory. As can be seen from our notation in (9), we
have implicitly assumed (for the sake of simplicity only) that the outcomes
of A’s spin measurement and of the Oˆ–measurement are recorded in separate
degrees of freedom. But in fact our argument below does not depend on this
assumption. Quantum mechanics itself imposes no restrictions whatsoever
on the way in which the outcomes of these measurements are recorded, except
that they cannot be recorded simultaneously in the same degree of freedom
(since σz ⊗ 1 as well as A’s memory observable are incompatible with Oˆ).
Moreover, quantum mechanics (with or without collapse) imposes no further
restrictions on the identity of the observers who may or may not carry out
Oˆ–type measurements.18 We return to this point below.
To make things simple, let us suppose that the Oˆ–measurement is to be
carried out by the external observer B. But now we can ask A to give her
predictions of the probabilities of the outcomes of the Oˆ–measurement.19 But
18See Albert (1983) for an extended discussion of Oˆ–type measurements and their im-
plications. Aharonov and Albert (1981) use Oˆ–type measurements in their discussion of
the collapse of the quantum state in a relativistic setting.
19Clearly, in quantum mechanics the quantum state assigned to a system is supposed
to give the probabilities of the outcomes for all possible measurements.
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here we encounter a problem in the information–theoretic approach since it
doesn’t tell us on what quantum state should A base her predictions.
In order to calculate her expected probabilities A may choose one of the
following two options.
(a) Update her quantum state in accordance with the outcome of the spin
measurement she actually observed, either |see up〉A or |see down〉A. In
this case, she would collapse the state (8) onto one of its spin+memory
components. Applying the Born rule to this state, she will predict that
the result of the Oˆ–measurement will be +1 with probability |α|2.
(b) Ignore the outcome of the spin measurement she actually observed, and
conditionalize her probabilities on the uncollapsed state as in (8). In
this case, since the state in (8) is an eigenstate of Oˆ with eigenvalue
+1, she will predict that the result of the Oˆ–measurement will be +1
with certainty (i. e., probability 1).
But by carrying out a series of repeated Oˆ–measurements on identically pre-
pared systems, all in state (8), we can distinguish experimentally between
the two predictions. Now, since we do not know whether or not post–
measurement states of the form (8) actually collapse, we do not know which
of these two predictions is correct. But, surely, they cannot be both true,
since they are inconsistent.
The point to be made here, however, is that the information–theoretic
approach gives no plausible account of which option is the correct one. On
the one hand, the full information about the lab available to A before the
Oˆ–measurement is given by the collapsed state, and this justifies option (a).
On the other hand, if A knows quantum mechanics under the information–
theoretic approach, the she believes that there is no real collapse of the state
in measurement, and so her predictions ought to be guided in this case by
the uncollapsed state as in (8). That is, on this view option (b) is justified.
So the two predictions seem to be on equal footing.
We have formulated the above argument in terms of the Bayesian
information–theoretic approach. The link to Bub’s principle approach goes
as follows. In both approaches quantum mechanical measurements are con-
strued operationally as ‘black boxes’ with no further analysis. This is pre-
cisely the sense intended by Bub (2005, Sec. 4) of taking quantum informa-
tion as a primitive and irreducible physical concept. As argued by Bub, once
we accept the three constraints suggested by the CBH theorem, it follows
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that measurements are to be treated operationally and measuring appara-
tuses as black boxes. But what our thought experiment above shows is that
once we treat measurements operationally, the assignment of quantum states
becomes (in some circumstances) ambiguous, and this ambiguity leads to
inconsistent probability assignments to measurement outcomes!
4.2 Some resolutions
The above ambiguity in the state assignment must be resolved. In what
follows we examine various possible ways in which a sophisticated propo-
nent of the information–theoretic approaches might try to counter the above
argument.
(i) Oˆ–type measurements are not feasible. As a matter of fact,
the Oˆ measurement is physically impossible to carry out due to decoherence
and the complexity of the set–up under consideration. As far as our best
neurophysiological theories tell us, the sensory apparatus and brain processes
of a human observer involved in typical perception and memory processes are
macroscopic and subject to continuous decoherence (induced by interactions
inand outside of the brain) that cannot be screened off. Consequently, Oˆ will
become extremely fast the wrong observable to measure in order to detect
the interference terms in states of the form of (8). Moreover, even if one
could identify the right observable to measure at a given time we cannot
expect to have control over all the relevant degrees of freedom in and outside
the observer’s brain.
Reply Obviously, Oˆ–type measurements are extremely hard to carry out
and need be continuously protected against decoherence. This is much be-
yond our experimental reach. In fact, even if we set decoherence aside, Oˆ–
type measurements are not quite feasible in microscopic superpositions over,
say, only spin degrees of freedom (since we need to measure total spin without
measuring the spin components separately in order for the measurement to
be non-disturbing). But ways to overcome such problems may be found. For
example, in spin–echo experiments we know today by means of macroscopic
manipulations only how to screen–off the effects of decoherence for appre-
ciable time intervals (see Hemmo and Shenker 2005). Moreover, feasibility
considerations are quite beside the point in the present context. Quantum
mechanics allows Oˆ–type measurements, and the above ambiguity need be
resolved independently of whether we can or cannot practically translate it
into an experimental context. Obviously, it may turn out that, on the basis
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of some new physics, e.g., quantum gravity, the Oˆ–measurement would be
impossible in principle on pain of violating certain new physical laws, but as
far as standard quantum theory is concerned, this is not the case.
(ii) Options (a) and (b) are compatible. There is no inconsistency,
because A’s different predictions are computed on the basis of different quan-
tum states (which may correspond to different points of views, different
amounts of information, etc.). Take for example the EPR set–up, and sup-
pose that only the observer on the left wing has measured the spin of the
nearby particle. The predictions of the two observers differ: the observer
on the left knows with certainty the result that would obtain on the right,
whereas the observer on the right can only assign probability of one–half to
his upcoming measurement.20 But surely differences in probability assign-
ments which are merely due to ignorance need not be problematic. This is
exactly the situation in the above thought experiment.
Reply The situation in the context of the Oˆ–measurement is entirely
different. In EPR-type situations the information–theoretic view does pick
out which observer gets it right: surely, the prediction of the observer on
the left who’s measured the spin of his particle is the more accurate one.
Obviously, the observer on the right will update her probability assignment
once she is informed about the outcome of the left measurement. But in
our contraption above, A already knows everything there is to know about
the z−spin in her lab before the Oˆ measurement, so there is no question of
information transfer from B to A. 21
20A similar argument can be made in the case of observers carrying out repeated mea-
surements on the same system.
21One can ask: what would happen if A were to communicate her outcome to B? Note
first that it is quite plausible to say that as long as B does not know the outcome of A’s spin
measurement, B’s predictions for the Oˆ measurement ought to conform to option (b) (but
see below). So B’s predictions are not ambiguous (unlike A’s predictions). What about
A’s predictions? Once A communicates her spin outcome to B, A’s predictions about the
Oˆ–measurement would no longer be ambiguous, since the reduced state of P +A after A’s
communication with B would be given by the mixture corresponding to the state (8) (and
the total state of P+A+B would no longer be an eigenstate of Oˆ). In fact, the predictions
of A and B would coincide in this case; that is, both would predict probability of one–half
to the outcome Oˆ = +1. But, quantum mechanics entails the existence of other Oˆ–type
observables (e. g., any observable Oˆ2 of which the state of P + A + B immediately after
the interaction of A and B is an eigenstate) with respect to which we can run the same
argument again, this time on the predictions of both A and B. And likewise ad infinitum.
But now the crucial point is that whether or not A communicates her outcome to B is
completely beside the point (we return to this point below). Suppose that A doesn’t.
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(iii) Option (b) is wrong. A should stick to option (a) and use her
spin–memory eigenstate in order to calculate her probabilities (likewise for
the external observer B). By construction, the above set–up stipulates that
A carried out a measurement, and therefore from A’s point of view the state
in (8) has collapsed. As to B, although he doesn’t know which outcome A
has observed in the lab, he knows that she has carried out a measurement.
Therefore, he ought to condition his predictions on the mixture of compo-
nents in (8) rather than the full superposition. On this view the predictions
of A and B for the Oˆ measurement coincide: they both give probability of
one–half to Oˆ = +1 despite the fact that their predictions are conditional on
different quantum states.
Reply This argument is wrong–headed in the context of the information–
theoretic approach, since it implies that a measurement induces a stochastic
transition from a pure to a mixed state. This, however, is exactly what’s
argued by collapse theories which aim at constructing a dynamical theory
in which such transitions can be accounted for. To put matters differently,
if option (b) is no option, then what is the difference between effective and
genuine collapses?
(iv) Option (a) is wrong. Only the full quantum state in (8) is the right
one for conditionalization (for both A and B), because the Oˆ–measurement
involves interference between the two components of the state in (8). A’s in-
formation about the outcome of the spin measurement becomes completely
irrelevant due to the objective (observer-independent) features of the dy-
namics of the quantum state involved in the Oˆ–measurement itself. In the
information–theoretic approach one could even argue that this is the ‘flipped-
side’ of the uncertainty relations: since the value of Oˆ is known in advance
with certainty, A’s information about the spin outcome is unreliable, and
this is manifested by the fact that A’s ‘memory’ of the spin value (i. e., her
record observable) and Oˆ are maximally non–commuting. Moreover, as sug-
gested by Bub (2005, Sec. 4), in the information–theoretic approach the
emergence of classical information is explained (only) by decoherence. But,
by construction, the Oˆ–measurement requires recoherence of the components
in (8). Therefore, whatever information these components carry ought to be
disregarded (by both A and B) in the face of the Oˆ–measurement. Hence
option (a) is no option, and the above inconsistency is resolved.
Then, A and B differ in their predictions about the outcome of the Oˆ–measurement. Why
not just carry out the measurement and see whose prediction is right?
22
Reply This is the strongest argument one can hope for in defense of
the Bayesian information–theoretic approach as well as Bub’s principle ap-
proach. But it relies on assumptions that are not explicitly stated in these
approaches. Consider the claim that A’s memory of her spin outcome is
unreliable in the face of the Oˆ–measurement. In so far as standard (opera-
tional) quantum mechanics goes, we are faced with a situation in which the
measurement of spin on P is followed by a measurement of Oˆ on P +M .
Since σz ⊗ 1 and Oˆ are (maximally) non–commuting, the statistics of their
outcomes on consecutive measurements satisfies the uncertainty relations,
so that the outcomes of the Oˆ–measurement are only probabilistically de-
termined by the outcome of the spin measurement (in accordance with the
Born rule). That’s about all we can say in an operational black box treat-
ment of measurements. Whether or not A’s memories are reliable during the
measurement of Oˆ is a question that cannot be settled by a quantum theory
of black boxes nor by the CBH constrains on information transfer. It cannot
even be settled by appealing to the fact that perceptions and memories most
plausibly need be modeled by systems that undergo environmental decoher-
ence. This is why the information–theoretic approaches do not circumvent
Bell’s (1990) objection that decoherence is not enough in order to make sense
of quantum measurement. So the above argument requires additional laws
(over and above the laws of quantum mechanics) about the dynamical behav-
ior of A’s memory during the interference involved in the Oˆ–measurement.22
But, strictly speaking, such laws are nothing but laws about the behavior
of hidden variables, and so accepting point (iv) above would be tantamount
to accepting that the information-theoretic approach is a hidden variables
theory in disguise.
Before concluding this section, let us sketch two further objections to our
thought experiment. It is sometimes claimed that our contraption above is,
for some reason, excluded as a matter of principle by quantum mechanics.
Although not explicitly stated as such in the literature, we have encountered
two types of arguments to this effect which in slightly different ways bear on
an alleged ‘impossibility of a God’s–eye view’ in quantum mechanics. These
22In Bohm’s theory, for example, A’s memory of the spin is perfectly reliable since the
trajectories given by Bohm’s deterministic guidance equation cannot cross each other. By
contrast, in modal interpretations where the dynamics of the extra values is stochastic,
A’s memory of the spin might flip during the Oˆ–measurement. Anyway, on either theory
the analysis of Oˆ–type measurements is a straightforward physical analysis, and neither
says that such measurements are unphysical or cannot be carried out, or what have you.
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two folklore arguments go roughly as follows.
(v) A single observer (say the observer A confined to the lab) cannot carry
out both the spin measurement and the Oˆ–measurement, since Oˆ is
an observable of P + A, and therefore measuring it by A entails some
problematic form of self-reference.
(vi) Oˆ and A’s spin memories (as we said above) do not commute, and
therefore no single observer can ever be in a position to know (with
complete certainty) the values of both σz and Oˆ (as manifested by the
uncertainty relations). So if A knows the value of σz (as we assume)
she cannot possibly know simultaneously also the value of Oˆ.
On both objections quantum theory itself imposes some sort of physical con-
straints as to the identity of the observers who may carry out Oˆ–type mea-
surements. In particular, this is taken to mean that Oˆ–type measurements
are for some reason meaningless, or that our charge of the inconsistency of
A’s predictions is somehow unphysical or cannot in principle be revealed by
a single experiment, as it requires a God’s–eye view which is unavailable to
us.
As a response we only wish to say that both these arguments and various
variants thereof are completely off the mark in the context of our thought
experiment. First, the question of whether or not our thought experiment
involves self–reference of any sort is irrelevant , since the issue boils down in
its entirety (as we presented it above) to a straightforward question about the
predictions of A as to the statistics of the outcomes of the Oˆ–measurement—
no matter who carries out the measurement ! Second, as a matter of fact,
our contraption above would involve no problematic form of self-reference
even if we were to assume that the Oˆ–measurement is to be carried out by
A herself. Third, quantum mechanics itself imposes no physical constraints
whatsoever on the identity of the observers who may carry out Oˆ–type mea-
surements. Fourth, our argument above leads to no sort of infinite regress
nor does it require any form of a God’s–eye view, as can be clearly seen from
the above formulation of the thought experiment and the discussion that
follows it.23 By this we have established our thesis III above, namely that
the information-theoretic approach is incomplete and nee be supplemented
by further principles.
23For a more extensive discussion of some of these issues we refer the reader to Albert
(1983, 1990).
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5 Conclusion: the Ancilla Argument
In this paper we have criticized the information–theoreticapproach to quan-
tum mechanics and Bub’s ‘principle’ reading of the CBH theorem. Agreed,
the theorem remarkably demonstrates that certain salient features of quan-
tum mechanics as we know it (by empirical observation) can be expressed
very elegantly in information–theoretic terms. But it does not support any
preference to the principle view of quantum theory over its constructive coun-
terparts. Moreover (and unlike other constructive no collapse theories), our
thought experiment clearly shows that the information–theoretic approach
does not address major unresolved interpretational issues of quantum theory
some of which await empirical resolution.24
More generally, the question raised by this paper boils down to the fol-
lowing. Do we know today whether quantum mechanics as is is here to stay,
or is it more plausible to suspend judgment and wait until new empirical
evidence comes in? Consider the following scenario. Suppose that crucial
experiments that are capable of distinguishing between, say the GRW theory
and environmentally induced decoherence were to come out (no kidding!)
in accordance with the GRW predictions to a very good approximation.25
Nevertheless, it is often argued by quantum–information theorists, the prin-
ciple (information–theoretic) approach to quantum mechanics would remain
intact for the following reason.
Suppose that an open system S is subjected to perfect decoherence,
namely to interactions with some degrees of freedom in the environment E,
such that the environment states become strictly orthogonal. Suppose fur-
ther that we have no access whatsoever (as a matter of either physical fact
or law) to these degrees of freedom. In this case, the GRW dynamics for the
density operator of S would be indistinguishable from the dynamics of the
reduced density operator of S obtained by evolving the composite quantum
state of S+E unitarily and tracing over the inaccessible degrees of freedom of
E. It turns out that this feature is mathematically quite general, because the
GRW dynamics for the density operator is a completely positive linear map
(see Nielsen and Chuang 2000, pp. 353-373; Simon, Buzek and Gisin 2001,
especially fn. 14). From a physical point of view, this means that the GRW
theory is empirically equivalent to a quantum mechanical theory with a uni-
24See also Hagar 2003.
25For recent progress see Adler 2005, Adler et al . 2005, Bassi et al . 2005a. See also
Hemmo and Shenker 2005 for experiments testing thermodynamical effects.
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tary (and linear) dynamics of the quantum state defined on a larger Hilbert
space. In other words, one could always introduce a new quantum mechan-
ical ancilla field whose degrees of freedom are inaccessible to us, and cook
up a unitary dynamics on the larger Hilbert space that would simulate the
GRW dynamics on the reduced density operator. Therefore, experimental
results that might seem to confirm GRW-like dynamics could always be re-
interpreted as confirming quantum mechanical no collapse theories on larger
Hilbert spaces. In particular, such a theory could always be made to satisfy
the three CBH constraints, and thus save the principle information–theoretic
approach.
In so far as information–theoretic approaches are concerned it seems to
us that the above argument is quite premature. In the present state of quan-
tum mechanics we are far from being able to pinpoint a principle theory
that need be protected come what may. The ancilla field in the above argu-
ment has, by construction, no observable effects (see, e.g., Diosi 1989) and
this amounts to introducing hidden variables (or more appropriately, a new
‘quantum ether’) into standard quantum mechanics, whose sole role is to save
some disputable principles against (putative) empirical refutation. If we are
willing to accept ad hoc such an argument in the context of non–relativistic
quantum mechanics, why should we reject similar ‘ether’–like approaches in
the context of relativity theory, or hidden variables theories in the context
of elementary quantum mechanics? Such approaches are sweepingly rejected
(by information theorists) mainly because their complex underlying struc-
ture doesn’t translate into new empirical predictions. Moreover, although
the ancilla theory could always be made to satisfy the three CBH principles
(in particular the NO BIT condition) on the larger Hilbert space, in so far
as our experimental capacities are concerned (as imagined in our scenario
above) unconditionally secure bit commitment would be possible via proto-
cols that require Alice or Bob to access the ancilla field (which ex hypothesis,
is inaccessible). So, the NO BIT principle as a constraint on the feasible flow
of information in the above story becomes quite idle.
More generally, we accept that one might have good reasons to protect
unitary quantum mechanics against what might seem as straightforward em-
pirical refutation. From a theoretical point of view it might turn out that
both collapse and hidden variables theories could not be made compatible
with some fundamental physical principles which we cannot give up without
giving up some significant chunk of contemporary theoretical physics (con-
26
servation of energy or Lorentz–covariance might be such examples).26 In
that case a protective argument of the kind suggested above might be under-
standable. But, in our view the present state of quantum mechanics doesn’t
warrant such an argument. This is mainly because quantum mechanics it-
self has quite deep foundational problems not only at its most basic level
(e. g., the measurement problem), but also for example in its generalizations
to both special and general relativity. In such circumstances we believe that
the right epistemological stance is to suspend judgment and let alternative
theories and the experimental confirmation thereof flourish.
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